The Background: Performance and Policies
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the Indian agricultural scene to understand where we are in terms of food policy and agriculture. Food policy is important because much of agricultural policy is affected by our ideas on food policy. What kind of policy have we been following in the past, what are its consequences, what can we expect in the future, what should be our strategic vision for the coming decades, and what policy actions should we take? This paper makes an attempt to discuss these issues in some detail.
Indian agriculture has made significant progress since independence. Production of food grains, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton, and milk in 1997-98 was four times as much as in 1950-51. As can be seen from Table 1 , we have attained self-sufficiency in many agricultural commodities. Production of eggs increased by 25 times and fish by more than 50 times.
This has been mainly an inward looking growth. The ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural GDP is around 7 per cent. The share of agricultural exports to total exports came down from 44 per cent in 1960-61 to 19 per cent in 1990-91. It has remained more or less constant at that level since. We have not seen agriculture as a major export sector. It has been driven more by the notion of self-sufficiency and less by comparative advantage. In spite of these gains in production, we have at least 50 million and possibly 200 million undernourished (suffering from chronic hunger) people in the country and, at the same time, more than 25 million tonne of foodgrains in the bufferstock. The persistence of hunger amidst abundance is the result of inadequate purchasing power with the hungry. They are hungry because they are poor. Agricultural policies alone cannot provide them food security. Other economic policies play an important role here. Nonetheless, agricultural policies have a profound impact on the poor.
As mentioned earlier, the country has between 200 million and 50 million hungry people. There is quite a difference between various estimates. We have a tendency to exaggerate poverty in the country and try to paint a grimmer picture than what the situation actually is. There is ^ome recent data to support this. In 1993-94, the national sample survey (NSS), along with the h ousehold consumption survey, inquired whether the household members get two square meals a day most of the time, sometimes or seldom. Figure  1 shows the results. Most people said they get two square meals most of the time. In rural areas, the figure rose to 94.5 per cent in 1993-94, from 81 per cent in 1983. In urban areas, this changed from 93.3 per cent in 1983 to 98.1 per cent in 1993-94. This indicates that the number of hungry people in the country is relatively small and modest. On the other hand, various estimates of persons below the poverty line (which is also an adequate food line) show that more than 200 million persons are hungry.
The main thrust of our agricultural policy has been on growth based on high-yield varieties, expansion of irrigation, and increased use of chemicals. The main policy dilemma lias been to find a way to provide to farmers incentives to grow more through remunerative prices and at the same time keep the food price low enough for the consumers. This is accomplished by a policy of low output prices and low prices for agricultural inputs of water, power, and fertilizers. Consumers are further protected through the Public Distribution System (PDS). As a consequence, the prices farmers receive for their produce are in general below international prices. Even then, the support prices are such that domestic demand is not adequate to absorb all the foodgrains the farmers produce. To ensure that the prices of foodgrains do not fall below support prices, the government is often required to augment its stocks by more than the desired amounts.
As Indian agriculture has grown, the input subsidies have increased. Fertilizer subsidy now runs to about Rs 8,000 crore a year. Irrigation subsidy, i.e., the implicit subsidy which is the difference between the real cost of supplying irrigation and what farmers actually pay for it, is about Rs 12,000 crore. Subsidy for power is Rs 10,000 crore, for credit Rs 7,000 crore and so on. So, the amount of foregone income by the government is very large in terms of subsidies given to agriculturists. The consequence has been that the fiscal deficit is now a major problem of managing the Indian economy. It continues to have many adverse impacts on the Indian economy at large and on the agricultural sector itself. For example, the power subsidy given to farmers is Rs 10,000 crore. Some states compensate the state electricity boards(SEBs) by direct budget transfer of Rs 3,000 crore, which still leaves a loss of Rs 7,000 crore a year to the SEBs. Suppose Rs 7,000 crore is available with the SEBs, then they can go to the capital market and raise may be four times as much money and totally they would have Rs 35,000 crore in a year. And with that amount they can set up 9,000 MW additional capacity every year and all our problems of not having enough power will disappear. The fact that finances of SEBs are in dire straits and that they do not have enough money to expand capacity actually hurts the farmers also. They are then given power only during eight hours Much of the subsidy given to agriculture is, in fact, subsidy to consumers. Were the farmers to be given international prices for their produce and charged international prices for the inputs, farm income would go up. The farm subsidies not only give farmers a bad name but also punish them. It would be in the interest of the farmers to give them fair prices and remove input subsidies. Vol. 24, No. 2, April -June 1999 Of course, farmers are also consumers and, to that extent, they lose when food prices go up. Small farmers with small or no marketable surplus would not be adequately compensated for higher input prices by the higher output prices. Consider a small farmer who produces rice just enough for his own consumption. In such a situation, if we raise procurement price for rice, and also raise price for fertilizer, this particular small farmer would be hurt. He has no surplus to sell. He eats all the rice he grows himself, so he does not benefit from the higher procurement price. However, he has to pay higher price for the fertilizer he uses. Therefore, a mechanism to compensate small farmers has to be created when subsidies are withdrawn. Eventually, we will have to eliminate subsidies and go to the world market price as per the world trade organization (WTO) agreement. In the process of doing this, we should be concerned about setting up a mechanism to protect the small farmers. It would matter whether we have 50 million poor or 200 million poor. The answer would give different strategies for development.
Apart from a price structure that discriminates against the farmers, there are also other policies that the government has followed over the years which go against the farmers. For example, movement restrictions are often imposed. Then the price in the surplus states fall. The farmers who grow that particular commodity get lower price. And, in the deficit state where it would have otherwise gone, consumers pay a higher price as less of it is available. We also have storage restrictions on who could store how much agricultural commodities and market manipulations for procurement. When the government wants to procure, it locks up the district. For example, it does not give wagons to traders to take out food even when food movement is not restricted. All these policies are meant to bring down prices that indirectly tax the farmers. The State Trading Corporation (STC) has a monopoly in agricultural trade and its inefficiency often hurts the farmers. The India n type of bureaucracies is least capable of handling international trade efficiently. In 1974, when the Russians had a crop failure, they decided to import 19 million tonne of food grains. They sent four or five buyers to New York who separately negotiated with five different traders and signed agreements within half an hour of each other to get the entire stock of foodgrains at a very cheap price. The world market suddenly shot up; however, the Russians had already bought up the foodgrains they wanted.
When it comes to international trade, we never follow such a strategy. We announce to the world when 5 we need to import and the traders raise the prices and we buy at higher prices. Public monopoly in trade hurts the farmer who gets a lower price and consumers who have to pay a higher price. Therefore, in both domestic and international dealings, private traders should be permitted to compete with public sector trading organizations.
Another important feature is the decreasing pace of innovation. The gr owth rates of yields in many crops have come down recently (Table 2 ). We can see that for most of the crops, the yield growth in the last seven to eight years has gone down compared to the yield growth that we had in the 80s. Why are the growth rates of yield coming down? To some extent, this is to be expected.
As seen in Figure 2 , when a farmer shifts to a High Yielding Variety (HYV) he gains a big boost in yield. Once he has made the transition to a HYV, subsequent yield increases have to come from input intensification, where diminishing marginal product would slow down yield increases. When more and more farmers shift to a HYV, the growth rate of yield can be very high. But, once all the farmers have adopted a HYV, then to create higher yield, more inputs are needed. It slows down the growth rate.
Moreover, a HYV loses vigour with time. Newer varieties have to be developed periodically to compensate and expand production possibilities. Experience has shown that this is possible to do. It greatly diminishes the importance of decreasing returns. The decreasing pace of agricultural yields in India can be an indication of diminishing vigour of our A careful review of its health is indicated. Also, the lack of success of our research establishment in introducing HYVs for the relatively drier regions and crops is a matter of concern. It is possible that this is in spite of an excellent programme and reasonable effort, for this is a difficult task. Yet, an evaluation of the efforts is required.
Consequences
The consequences of these policies are the following :
• Farmers do not get the prices they should for their product nor do they pay what they should for the inputs. Their incentive to produce is reduced and distorted in favour of certain crops.
• The decreasing public investment in enabling in frastructure lias lowered the pace of agricultural growth.
• With decreasing investment, government's ability to promote faster development in backward areas gets limited. Thus, regional disparities persist. This also means that small and marginal farmers in certain areas, who depend on public investment to augment their produc tion potential, remain neglected.
• Fiscal stress on government budget also means that allocation for agricultural research does not grow at the required pace. Our long-term production potential gets reduced.
Looking Ahead: A Strategic Vision
As the Indian economy grows, a very large number of workers from agriculture would have to be absorbed in the non-agricultural sectors. To maintain the present ratio between per capita rural and urban income of around 2.0, approximately, 5 to 10 per cent Vol. 24, No. 2, April -June 1999 of the population dependent on agriculture would have to be absorbed in non-agricultural sector over the next ten years. Industrialized countries have maintained income parity by increasing agricultural prices through subsidies. This route is not available to us as we will have to liberalize agricultural trade and our domestic prices have to be similar to world prices. Thus, either the economy must grow in a labour intensive manner or agricultural growth has to substantially exceed 4 per cent per year.
Liberalization, on the other hand, offers tremendous scope for agricultural exports. India has the potential to be a major exporter of not only cereals but also of high value items like fresh fruits, vegetables, and flowers. We have the right kind of climate and are geographically well-located. Therefore, we need to give right incentives to the farmers and the right kind of infrastructure to enable them to trade in competitive international markets.
As the per capita income in India grows, the consumption pattern will change. Increased demand for animal products will result. More fruits and vegetables will be consumed. This will require more feeds. The best way to deal with this is to let prices provide the appropriate signals to the farmers and let the farmers have the flexibility to respond. So we need to have a very liberalized agricultural system.
We have to recognize also that there will be increased demand for processed foods. As economies grow, people consume more processed food. In Europe and the US, people buy vegetables which are cleaned, chopped, and ready to be cooked, whereas in India, we clean and cut them ourselves. Today, a lot of processing which was done by the household earlier is increasingly getting done outside. So, processing is a major new growth area. In the US, only 12 per cent of what the consumer spends on his food goes to the farmer; the rest goes towards processing, transport, and retailing.
The new advancements in biotechnology should make it easier to develop products of uniform quality needed for exports. Of course, biotechnology also poses some problems. We need to organize a system of checks and controls on biotechnology so that farmers' rights as well as consumers' rights are preserved. The main objective should be to maximize farm productivity and income in a globalized setting. This calls for a competitive sector which is also a vigorous exporting sector. The objective of regional equity will be best served by the pursuit of the main objective. Food security at the national level to ensure certain aggregate availability is a legitimate objective for a large country. Certain levels of self-sufficiency (not necessarily 100%) may be desirable so that reliance on trade (which can be very large) is still kept within limits. Food security at the individual level is more a problem of economic development and of providing adequate purchasing power to the poor. Agricultural policies may not be the best way of providing it. However, food price stability is also critical for food security of the poor. Thus, food price stability becomes an important goal.
A nation-wide Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) can be a cost-effective anti-poverty measure and, hence, an effective way to provide food security. Once the poor are given purchasing power, food would be brought to them. EGS has the advantages of being self-targeting to the needy, self-adjusting to the changing demands, and self-liquidating when it becomes redundant. With a comprehensive EGS in place, we can set our concern for the poor at rest, and agricultural policies can concentrate on productivity and efficiency.
If we compare EGS with the PDS (which is the darling of many people, many economists included), the PDS does not differentiate between the rich and the poor. It gives everyone more or less the same amount and is not cost-effective. (Table 3 ).
If we look at the data on how much income support people get from the cereals they get from PDS, we can see that a large fraction of people do not get any food from the PDS in many states. Nearly 91-99 per cent do not get any cereals in Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, and Rajasthan. Even in West Bengal, 73 per cent do not get anything. Also, the percentage of people who purchase all their cereals from the PDS is very small. The last column shows the money equivalent of the income support they get. Suppose we get wheat from PDS at Rs 4 per kg and we get 10 kg a month, and if the price on the market is Rs 6, then the income support we get is Rs 20, which is the difference between the market cost and the PDS cost. On an average, in most states, the income support received even by those who make all their cereal purchases from PDS is Rs 2.5 to Rs 3.5 per person per month. Also, the bottom 80 per cent of the people get more or less the same on a per capita basis. The data in Table 3 pertain to the years 1986-87 as recent figures are not available. Indications are that the pattern may be fairly similar. In essence, the PDS is a very inefficient way of providing income support to the poor. For every rupee that is delivered to the poor, the government spends Rs 5 on the PDS, whereas it spends only Rs 2 on EGS. So there is a very large difference in efficiency. The reason for thinking in terms of an income support of some kind is that, as already pointed out, once we have provided the support, we can think much more rationally about agricultural policy.
Policy Options
Unlike Indian industry, the Indian farmer has operated in a competitive environment. Me is an efficient farmer, i.e., given the prices he faces and the available resources, he optimizes his own consumption and income. Thus, to increase agricultural output, we must make it feasible and profitable for the farmer.
The most important step is to liberalize agricultural sector and give farmers international prices for outputs and inputs. This transition can be made over a period of three years. Farmers may have to be protected against short-term fluctuations of international prices. Domestic price stability at the international trend rate may be maintained. This may b e accomplished through a mix of domestic buffer-stock and trade policy. All agricultural commodities should be put under Open General License (OGL). Export quotas on some commodities may be imposed and auctioned off. The quotas have to be consistent with stabilization objectives. All domestic restrictions should be removed so that farmers can decide on the most appropriate allocation of their resources.
There are also concerns about land degradation and sustainability of agriculture. Some people say that a large part of our land is degraded. By and large, one would expect a farmer to know that land is his major source of income. He would want to take care of the land as much as he could. Any rational person would want to preserve his productive asset in a proper way. So, one would expect that he would take care of his asset. In spite of that, if he seems to degrade it, we should ask ourselves: is he really degrading it or is it a rational thing for him to do? A Ph D thesis by Sudhir Sharma (1999) shows how the cultivation practices of Punjab farmers are rational even from a long-term point of view. This is not to say that often farmers may not know what they are doing to their land. In the case of many pesticides that are being marketed today, the farmers do not really know the true nature of the pesticides they are purchasing. They are unaware of the adverse consequences of these pesticides on their health as their source of information is only the trader or the representative of the pesticides company. So, we need to introduce a vigorous public information system which tells the farmer the advantages and dangers of using particular pesticides. Once he is informed, we can expect him to take the right decision.
However, the actions of many farmers, each acting rationally, may lead to environmental degradation. Such is the case with over-exploitation of groundwater and the resulting lowering of water-table in many parts of the country. Equitable allocation of groundwater resources is required. However, it may be difficult to introduce community ownership of groundwater as it has been treated as an open access resource and only limited constraints on spacing of wells exist. A possible approach is to impose a cess on groundwater use. The panchayat could use this revenue for land development and other community development programmes. It can build schools, hospitals, roads, drainage, etc. Thus, we need to think in terms of these kind of social mechanisms to manage certain community resources.
For farmers to obtain good prices for their products, marketing and transport infrastructure should be improved to minimize transaction costs. Good road, Vol. 24, No. 2, April -June 1999 better communication facilities, and organized markets improve the prices received by farmers. To facilitate trade and open up new markets for the farmers, cold chains from farm gate to ports and airports need to be developed. The government has a vital role to play in these areas.
To sustain agricultural growth, a regular flow of new seeds and technology is required as varieties lose vigour after some time. A vital research system that is creative, dynamic, and responsive to changing needs and circumstances must be maintained. A public research system competing with private researchers should be adequately funded and so organized that creativity and success are rewarded. At the same time, it should not be a public monopoly and all obstructions against private research should be removed.
A mechanism to prepare strategic plans and research goals should be set up which involves the finest minds in the country from within and outside the government. The plan should set goals for different agro-climatic zones, soils, and crops. It should balance probability of success against likely social pay-offs from alternative lines of research. The plan should also recognize the potential of biotechnology and information revolution. Otherwise, Indian farmers would lose their competitive edge against farmers in countries which exploit these potential. While exploiting the potential of biotechnology, we should regulate it to keep it safe, to maintain transparency through public information, to ensure consumers the right to choose if he/she wants to consume such products or not, and to retain an ethical perspective that precludes "terminator" seed type greed. This plan should be based on an understanding of what are the available options and what is it that we should do. In Figure 4 , we show four yield response curves. The first one shows the response of the actual cultivated variety and the cultivation technology used. Curve 2 represents the best available variety. Curves 3 and 4 show the biological agro-climatic potential without and with irrigation. Suppose the farmer is working at point Y JX point Y 2 reflects the economic optimum with the best available variety, whereas point Y 3 is a socially optimum level. We can say that the difference between Y 2 and Y T is an extension gap because, with extension, the farmer should be producing at Y 2 . The difference be tween Y 3 and Y 2 , on the other hand, is a policy gap. With appropriate changes in policy, we could induce the farmer to produce at Y 3 . Similarly, we define the research gap and the land development gap.
A systematic analysis of identifying the various gaps in different parts of the country should be done and based on that we should work out a strategic development plan for each region. We should have a tremendous comparative advantage in research, including biotechnology. To fully exploit it, we should set up an appropriate regime of intellectual property rights that also protects plant varieties and farmers' rights. This should not only encourage private sector research but also benefit public sector researchers. A government scientist should also have the right to profit from his/her research and some kind of incentive should be given to scientists of Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) as well. A dominant public sector research establishment should protect farmers from possible exploitation by private sector researchers. However, vigorous private sector research would provide essential competition. Healthy competition would accelerate innovation.
Conclusion
Given the incentive of remunerative prices, a supportive infrastructure of irrigation, roads, markets, and export facilities, a steady supply of new HYVs, Indian agriculture can be productive, vigorous, and competitive, able to not only face the challenge of a globalized world but thrive from it. Refernces Sharma, Sudhir (1999 
